海外之声 | 中国在下一盘“耐心棋” ：中国会采取更有分寸的措施抵制美国关税（中英双语）

观点速递

本文作者是国际货币金融机构官方论坛（OMFIF）顾问委员会委员、巴林银行战略关系管理团队成员加里·史密斯。原文率先刊发于5月8日的OMFIF Commentary。OMFIF是一家总部位于伦敦的全球金融智库。

作者提出，面对美国最近施加的关税，中国政府不太可能会抛售美国国债。比起应对清算头寸带来的后果，保持大额、稳定的美国国债头寸可能更有利，而且美联储轻易就能处理掉中国出售的美国国债。中国可能会在贸易和投资上予以回应，征收对美国进口商品的关税以及进一步限制美国在中国的投资。同时也可以考虑购入实物资产。

中文译文如下：

中国在下一盘“耐心棋”

中国会采取更有分寸的措施抵制美国关税

加里·史密斯 写于华盛顿

翻译：尹柔茜

审校：陆可凡

2018年5月8日

此前有人猜测，中美之间的贸易争端会促使中国政府抛售美元国债。尽管中国领导人被迫对美国最近施加的关税进行报复，目前不太可能会把外汇储备用于该目的。西方对中国贸易惯例的合理投诉，这些投诉似乎很难有所进展，但是中方的回应也不太可能触发全面的金融危机。

中国官员会在制定政策时仔细权衡棘手的问题。金融教科书指出：抛售美元计价的资产会让美元承受下行压力。但此举也会威胁到中国出口，再考虑当前贸易争端背景，中国是否希望出现这种局面，还值得怀疑。然而局势可能变得比一开始看上去更微妙。货币流动并不总是遵循理论。如果报复是为了引发一场美国金融危机，那么2008年金融危机的经历可能值得关注。

十年前，美国次贷危机演变成全球危机，美元却因“资金流向安全性资产（flight to quality）”而受益。出现这种有悖常理的结果，是因为美元在国际贸易融资中雄踞霸主地位。

中国政府开始在全球贸易网中推广使用人民币，部分考量是想让中国在未来危机中处于更强势的地位。任何可能引发资金流向美元这一安全性资产和增强美元霸主地位的行为，都将与过去十年的人民币国际化之路背道而驰。

而且，美联储轻易就能处理掉中国出售的美元国债。中国即使想在金融市场上小试牛刀，最好也避开这种美国政府轻而易举就能摆平的举动。此外，2015年至2016年间，中国清算了约1万亿美元的外汇储备，其中约三分之二都以美元计价，在那期间，美国国债收益率其实已经下降了。

对中国而言，比起应对清算头寸带来的后果，保持大额、稳定的美国国债头寸可能更有利。事实上，按兵不动可能才是成功之策。自特朗普总统上台以来，中国一直善于占领国际关系中空缺的道德高地。

在美国走向保护主义的同时，中国热衷充当自由贸易捍卫者。此举不仅可能增加中国国际公信力，也符合“一带一路”倡议的目标，而“一带一路”倡议或有助于建立以中国为中心的贸易网络，进一步助推人民币国际化。

中国可能会在贸易和投资上对美国施加的关税予以回应，包括征收对美国进口商品的关税以及进一步限制美国在中国的投资。中国如果做出有分寸的回应，可能降低其他国家对中国贸易补贴或对知识产权保护不佳的担忧。

外汇储备方面，可以参考樊纲的意见，他是央行货币政策委员会委员和国家外汇管理局（央行的分支机构）的顾问。他曾表示中国不应继续购买美国国债，而应该购入实物资产。对中国而言，这可能是下一盘“耐心棋”和“技巧棋”的好时机。

英文原文如下：

China plays the long chess game

Beijing will adopt measured response against US tariffs

Gary Smith in Washington

 8 May 2018

There has been speculation that the trade dispute between the US and China could prompt Beijing to sell down its holdings of US Treasury debt. While Chinese leaders clearly feel compelled to retaliate against Washington's recently imposed tariffs, it is unlikely that foreign exchange reserves would be used for this purpose. Progress on some of the West's legitimate complaints about China's trade practices seems remote, but so does any Chinese response that might trigger a fully-fledged financial crisis.

Chinese officials will weigh some difficult issues as they shape their strategy. Textbooks would suggest that selling dollar-denominated assets would put downward pressure on the dollar. It is doubtful that this is an outcome China would want against the backdrop of a trade dispute that, in a wider sense, would threaten its own export performance. However, the situation might be more nuanced than it first appears. Currency movements do not always conform to theory. If retaliation were intended to trigger a US financial crisis, the experience of the 2008 crisis might be worth heeding.

A decade ago, as the US housing crisis morphed into a global crisis, the dollar benefited from a 'flight to quality'. This perverse outcome was a consequence of dollar hegemony in the financing of international trade.

Beijing began the process of establishing its own currency in the global trading network partly to ensure that China would be in a stronger position in a future crisis. Any Chinese reaction that risks triggering a flight to quality onto the dollar, and which boosts dollar hegemony, would be inconsistent with the decade-long policy of internationalising the renminbi.

Moreover, there is nothing to stop the Fed from simply mopping up any Chinese sales of US debt. China, even if it were inclined to embark on a financial market skirmish, might be wise to avoid one that US authorities could neuter with minimal effort. Moreover, in 2015-16, China liquidated around $1tn in foreign exchange reserves, of which around two-thirds were probably denominated in dollars. During that period, US bond yields actually declined.

For China, the benefits of maintaining a large and stable position in US debt instruments might be more useful than weathering the consequences of liquidating that position. In fact, doing nothing might be a winning strategy. China has been adept at filling the vacated moral high ground in international relations since the election of President Trump.

China has been keen to position itself as a defender of free trade at a time when the US is moving towards protectionism. This would also enhance China's international standing but would be consistent with the objectives of the Belt and Road initiative, which may help establish a China-centric trade network and further boost international usage of the renminbi.

The Chinese response to US tariffs will probably focus on trade and investment, including tariffs against US imports and further restrictions on US investment in China. A measured response may encourage other nations to tone down their concerns about Chinese trade subsidies or poor protection of intellectual property.

In terms of foreign exchange reserves, the views of Fan Gang, a member of the People's Bank of China and adviser to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, a subsidiary of the central bank, are relevant. He has said that China should not buy more US debt but should instead buy real assets. From the Chinese perspective, this could be a good time to exhibit patience and skill in playing the long chess game.

内容整理 罗梦宇

图文编辑 罗梦宇

审校  田雯

监制  朱霜霜

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